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“The only cure for Romanticism is to analyse it.”
—T.S. Eliot (27)
The title of this essay carries a double valence. It indicates, first, the as-
pects of Romantic literature that Jacques Lacan particularly valued and, 
second, that Romanticism was, from its own historical moment, already 
“Lacan’s.” By this latter point, I don’t especially mean that  Romantic po-
etry anticipated Lacanian insights (although others, such as Ben Hewitt, 
have argued this recently) but rather that the Romantic period created 
“Lacan,” so to speak. His enigmatic persona, his guarded fascination 
with revolution, his fusion of scientific and poetic writing, his intellectual 
touchstones, such as Kant, Sade, and Hegel, his devotion to the uncon-
scious, his devotedness to categorizing and classifying ways of being ac-
cording to their investments in enjoyment—all of these are inheritances 
of Romanticism. Lacan felt that Romanticism had a special connection to 
psychoanalytic thought, even calling British Romanticism “the fertile … 
period” in the prehistory of psychoanalytic writing  (Seminar V, 92). In 
this essay, I want to account for that special connection, by discussing 
the innovative role of jouissance in Romantic-era literature. The culture 
of sexuality, motivated by desire and haunted by jouissance, that Lacan 
would devote his career to disentangling, was, I will argue, developed in 
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, especially in literary 
texts, and Lacan understood this intuitively.
Over the past decade or so, it has become apparent to Romanticists 
that the Romantics “invented” psychoanalysis, through the “remark-
able” “clinical features” of their texts (Faflak, 7, 5). The era, it would 
seem, also coined the modern notion of the unconscious and developed 
the paradoxical and enigmatic structures of sexuation that Lacan would 
diagram in his later seminars (Garofalo, “Gaze and Voice”; Sigler). We 
might then say that Romanticism created both the methodologies and 
objects of Lacanian inquiry. To put it baldly, an alternate universe in 
which there had been no Romanticism would be a universe without 




sexuality and subjectivity would have been so differently constituted, 
or (more likely) he would have been devoting himself to other topics. 
He would not been “Lacan” in the sense that that name registers with 
us today. Hence, Lacan cherished British Romanticism, but British 
 Romanticism invented Lacan, and the overdetermination of my essay’s 
title will imply, I hope, that these two aspects of “Lacan’s Romanticism” 
are tied together, though at first they may seem separate.
To show their interconnectedness, this essay will trace “Lacan’s 
 Romanticism” across three registers: we have Lacan’s Romanticism at 
the level of the Imaginary, in which Lacan, discussing Romanticism in 
his Seminar and discovering himself in its innovations, says, in effect, 
“that’s me!” We have Lacan’s Romanticism at the level of the Symbolic, 
by which I mean how we have learned to track the rising discourse of 
sexual enjoyment within British Romanticism. It was a time of win-
nowing pleasures, in which heteronormative ideologies were congealing 
around an obligatory two-sex system (see Laqueur; Nagle), but that was 
concurrently developing a scientific language of sexuality and perversion 
(see George; Sha). Conservative commentators of the era saw it as an age 
of “national effeminacy” (Woman, 1.219–220). The meaning of sexual 
difference and the connotations of “woman” were both radically up for 
debate, as shown in the scholarly work of David Collings, Gary Kelly, 
and Daniela Garofalo (Garofalo, Women, 1–29) and as we can easily see 
in literary texts like The Prelude, Frankenstein, Sense and Sensibility, 
and A Vindication of the Rights of Woman. One can see the effects of 
this cultural transformation everywhere within Romantic literature. The 
poet-novelist Charlotte Smith, for instance, cast herself in a variety of 
incompatible but culturally recognizable roles, asking to be recognized 
as “woman” within each of them, as Jacqueline Labbe has argued (3). 
As Labbe notes, Smith’s experiments in womanhood exploit the lay-
ered apparatus of the Lacanian Imaginary and Symbolic (Labbe,  10). 
This, I would add, was possible because subjectivity was beginning to 
be haunted by a new concept called the “unconscious”: there was an 
emergent sense that part of the subject was not merely unknown, but 
completely unknowable—there was an autonomous thing “within me” 
that “I” cannot “revive,” as Samuel Taylor Coleridge once put it (La-
can, Seminar XI, 21; Coleridge, 42). The Romantics, confronting the 
unconscious and theorizing desire as its consequence, saw the latter as 
the product of a drive that necessarily misses its aim as it attempts to 
recoup lost sexual enjoyment. We see a clear example of this in the Irish 
writer Anne Burke’s novel The Sorrows of Edith (1796), the story of a 
woman suffering under the burden of her desire and driven to suicide by 
an interminable melancholia: “I had, unconsciously, cherished the de-
structive passion; and when I discovered the real state of my heart, it was 
long ere I ventured to reveal it to the object of my adoration.” For Burke’s 
Edith, the state of one’s own heart can be the object of a painstaking 
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investigation, given how one’s “cherished” pleasures are enjoyed only 
“unconsciously.” There is a dread, in this passage, of being parasitized 
by one’s own enjoyment: “a canker-worm preys upon my heart, and 
poisons all the enjoyments of life,” Edith laments (Burke, 1.32). Which 
leads us to Lacan’s Romanticism at the level of the Real: the impossible 
jouissance itself, which shouldn’t be, but never fails, and thus “never 
stops not being written” within the literature of the period (Lacan, 
Seminar XX, 59). The autonomy of one’s desire was understood to be a 
burden, particularly on women, in an era in which “Every indecent curi-
osity, or impure fancy, is a deflowering of the mind, and … defilement of 
the body too: for between the state of pure unspotted virginity and pros-
titution, there are not many intermediate steps” (Kenrick, 29). Yet, as the 
stakes of desire were ratcheting up in the arena of female conduct, “eros 
became the emotional engine of a revolutionary-utopian programme” 
for feminist writers such as Mary Wollstonecraft (Taylor, 142).
Figuration is the tie that holds this Borromean knot together, across 
the three registers: it is the sinthome of Lacan’s Romanticism, “a fourth 
term [that] has to be supposed” (Lacan, Seminar XXIII, 11). Lacan’s 
Romanticism is, in a very direct sense, poetic, as figuration is the differ-
ence that all three levels have in common (Lacan, Seminar XXIII, 40). 
In the unpublished Seminar XXV, specifically the session of December 
20, 1977, Lacan explains this poetic sinthome quite directly (by Laca-
nian standards). He had just been demonstrating an especially complex 
Borromean knot, comprised of a “six-fold torus” meant to illustrate the 
relationship between the Real and fantasy, as they intersect with knowl-
edge and the pleasure principle. In an unexpected turn of argument, 
he concludes the demonstration by saying: “This puts a stress on the 
fact that there is no reality. Reality is constituted only by phantasy, and 
phantasy is moreover what gives material for poetry.” Fantasy, in this 
way of thinking, produces two “realities”: the “real world,” as we expe-
rience it, and also literature. Literature becomes another plane of reality, 
just as “material” as the real world because it is made out of language. It 
is not that reality has poetic features; it is that poetry is a real world, no 
less real because it is fantasmatic: “The stuff of metaphor is that which 
in thought constitutes matter,” Lacan explains. This, he asserts, is what 
makes psychoanalysis a form of “poetry”: “it is art,” he insists, and “it is 
poetry,” even if it “functions as science.” Although it acts as if it were a 
science, psychoanalysis is actually the art of “working in the impossible 
to say,” as Lacan explains: “In any case what is involved in this practice 
is moreover poetry. I am speaking of the practice that is called analy-
sis. Why did someone called Freud succeed in his poetry, I mean, in es-
tablishing a psychoanalytic art?” (Lacan, Seminar XXV, sec.20.12.77). 
Lacan, the purveyor of literary language, is in effect his own sinthome: 
the psychoanalyst, as poet of the impossible, binds together the strands 
discovered in the overladen term “Lacan’s Romanticism.”
58 David Sigler
Lacan tended to see Romantic poetry as the unspoken or hidden part 
of psychoanalysis and an important “silent partner” for Freud. Here I 
am using the term “silent partner” in the sense that Slavoj Žižek uses 
it: thinkers “connected to his thought by a secret link, and … crucial 
for a proper understanding of his work” (Žižek, 1). Hence, a return to 
Freud is by extension also an engagement with British Romanticism. 
We find a clear case in point in Lacan’s analysis of Freud’s Psycho- 
analytic Notes on an Autobiographical Account of a Case of Paranoia 
(1911), commonly known as the Schreber case. Freud, Lacan points 
out, was able to read the lacunae in Schreber’s Memoir of My Nervous 
Illness (1903) by cross-referencing Schreber’s text with Lord Byron’s 
play Manfred (1817). Schreber, Freud observes, attributes the phrase 
“soul-murder” to Byron, and sees in Manfred a Faustian bartering for 
the soul (Freud SE, 12.44). Freud, knowing his Byron well, leaps into 
interpretive action: Byron’s text doesn’t speak of “soul-murder” or fea-
ture any soul-bartering—indeed, it’s Manfred’s refusal to barter that 
gives him his defiant dignity. Because Manfred was informing Schre-
ber’s text through its own gaps and silences, in ways that exceed its 
actual content, Freud could surmise that Schreber was finding a way, 
through displacement, to tacitly acknowledge fraternal-sororal incest in 
his own biography (Freud SE, 12.44). Freud’s knowledge of Romantic 
literature enabled him to decode Schreber’s “censored chapter,” Lacan 
explains, which, being “missing in its entirety,” had “mutilated the 
text of his Memoirs” (Lacan, Écrits, 466). It is in this sense that true 
Freudians are necessarily Romanticists by extension, one we can see 
Romantic-era writing as a silent partner of psychoanalytic reason. As 
the Schreber case reveals, the thematic preoccupations of the period’s 
literature can often address difficulties in contemporary psychiatric and 
psychoanalytic discourse.
William Wordsworth provides a crucial case in point, because he both 
attracts Lacan’s attention and laments the loss of primordial jouissance. 
In Seminar VII, Lacan quotes the phrase “The Child is father of the 
Man,” a famous line from the epigraph to Wordsworth’s “Ode: Inti-
mations of Immortality” (Lacan, Seminar VII, 24). Because the state-
ment is a metaphor, and because it arrives into the seminar by way of 
allusion, we are already knee-deep in figural language, even at the out-
set. Interestingly, Lacan quotes Wordsworth to highlight the difference 
between his own psychoanalytic musings and a Romantic sensibility, 
 calling Wordsworth’s sentiment “a dated notion that was born long 
before psychoanalysis.” Yet he also recognizes an affiliation between 
Wordsworth’s “notion” and the Freudian project, explaining to his au-
dience that, “the phrase comes from Wordsworth, the English romantic 
poet, and is quoted respectfully by Freud” (Lacan, Seminar VII, 24). In 
the following year’s Seminar, Lacan reopens this point in a new context, 
explaining that the tendency for artists to identify with children “dates 
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back to the beginning of the Romantic period, starting more or less at 
the time of Coleridge in England” (Seminar VIII, 239).
Guinn Batten has published an extensive analysis of Lacan’s allu-
sion to Wordsworth in Seminar VII. In Batten’s reading, Lacan invokes 
Wordsworth to explain that, although people generally want immedi-
ate solutions to their problems, from either poetry or psychoanalysis, 
poetry, like psychoanalysis, can only hold open the Real (Batten, 577). 
Indeed, that is the context in which Lacan alludes to Wordsworth. Yet, 
I am equally interested in the discussion that immediately follows, be-
cause Lacan’s allusion initiates a movement in the opposite direction: 
instead of continuing to draw a continuity between nineteenth-century 
poetry and post-Freudian psychoanalysis, Lacan begins to insist that 
Wordsworth’s idea is “historically situated.” Certainly, the idea that 
Wordsworth was capturing—that is, that childhood memories endure 
into adulthood and largely shape the psychic life of adults—is an idea 
with a long history of its own. As Lacan reminds us, psychoanalysis is 
just the latest iteration of
that reference to childhood, the idea of the child in the man, the 
idea that something demands that a man be something other than a 
child, but that the demands of the child as such are perpetually felt 
in him.
(Seminar VII, 24–25)
Yet it is not a universal sentiment. Lacan stresses that the pernicious con-
tinuation of childhood in other forms, an idea fundamental to psycho-
analysis, is particularly an innovation of British writing of the Romantic 
period. As he puts it:
It is no accident that we discover it in that period with its fresh, 
shattering, and even breathtaking quality, bursting forth at the be-
ginning of the nineteenth century with the industrial revolution, in 
the country that was most advanced in experiencing its effects, in 
England. English romanticism has its own special features, which 
include the value given to childhood memories, to the whole world 
of childhood, to the ideals and wishes of the child. And the poets of 
the time drew on this not only for the source of their inspiration, but 
also for the development of their principal themes—in this respect 
they are radically different from the poets who preceded them and 
especially from that wonderful poetry of the seventeenth and early 
eighteenth century.
(Lacan, Seminar VII, 24–25)
The noteworthy thing for me is not that Lacan urges psychoanalysts 
to perform a task traditionally handled by poetry, which is Batten’s 
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emphasis, but rather that he historicizes Romanticism by stressing the 
“special features … of the time.” Lacan understands Romanticism 
to be part of a cultural superstructure formed in parallel with a new 
 industrial-capitalist economy, which is why, in his estimation, it sharply 
differs from older traditions of poetry, or poetry from other countries. It 
is English Romanticism in particular that begins to respond to the legacy 
of childhood enduring, unconsciously, into adulthood.
It is not actually clear that Romanticism even evinced a new and 
different attitude toward childhood. “What was novel about the rep-
resentation of childhood in canonical Romantic writing?” asks Alan 
Richardson: “In many ways, nothing” (171). It was more the recombi-
nation of several longstanding views. Yet, Wordsworth’s Immortality 
Ode was an important cultural touchstone for discussions of childhood 
throughout the nineteenth century, as Richardson notes—and, I would 
add, it is in this context that Freud would have received Wordsworth’s 
poem. This is how and why the word “intimations” is, as Jacques Derrida 
observes, “exposed in its very depths to psychoanalytic radiation” (112). 
The metaphor “The Child is father of the Man,” like Lacan’s invocation 
of it, goes far beyond merely affirming the enduring legacy of child-
hood. By the time Lacan seizes upon this line in 1959, we are already 
caught within a chain of texts: Lacan is quoting Wordsworth quoting 
 Wordsworth in the epigraph to the Ode. Specifically, Wordsworth is 
quoting his own poem “My Heart Leaps Up,” which first appeared in his 
1807 collection, Poems in Two Volumes. An early version of the Immor-
tality Ode appeared as the final poem in that collection, then without the 
epigraph or its conclusion. Those, along with the poem’s subtitle about 
“Intimations of Immortality,” were added for the revised 1815 version. 
Thus, the Immortality Ode in, in a sense, the “child,” but also “father,” 
but also the sibling, of “My Heart Leaps Up.” Hence, implicit to Lacan’s 
comment is both a shifting culture of childhood across the nineteenth 
century and an interplay between the two Wordsworth poems, across 
multiple versions. If we put these poems into closer contact with each 
other, in the context of Lacan’s commentary on childhood, Romanti-
cism, we can locate the sinthome of Lacan’s Romanticism.
The two poems, each hinging on the line “The Child is father of the 
Man,” work at obvious cross-purposes, even as they complement one 
another. “My Heart Leaps Up” primarily expresses confidence that the 
speaker’s sentimental response to “A rainbow in the sky” is steadfast 
and permanent: “So was it … / So is it now … So be it when I shall grow 
old, / Or let me die!” (“My Heart,” ll.2–6). At a basic level, the poem 
is making exactly the opposite argument as the Immortality Ode: my 
feelings about rainbows are unchanging and reliable, the speaker of “My 
Heart” seems to be saying; I have lost my ability to rejoice at rainbows, 
confesses the speaker of the Immortality Ode. Yet, several details com-
plicate this interpretation. The speaker says “so be it” instead of “so it 
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shall be,” contrary to the dictates of the poem’s iambic tetrameter. This 
turns the statement from what might have been a reliable promise to a 
performative demand. Yet, the speaker demands “it” from the Other 
only conditionally: the speaker shall be allowed to enjoy rainbows, “Or 
let me die!” The irony is of course that the speaker, like everyone, is 
indeed allowed to die—expected to do so, even. The hard dichotomy of 
this “or” functions like Lacan’s vel of alienation, “Your money or your 
life!” (Lacan, Seminar XI, 211). That is, there is a zone of non-meaning 
between the two options, whereby the subject ends up with neither en-
joyment of rainbows nor permission to die, because one of the options 
contains “the lethal factor” (Seminar XI, 213, emphasis in original). The 
speaker, through making a demand for enjoyment, soon finds himself 
between being and meaning, enjoying only in the defiles of the signifier, 
according to its narrow parameters. Because the speaker is presumably 
not immortal, the Other can only fulfill this demand while sapping the 
speaker of his enjoyment of rainbows. That is, the poem, which seems 
to demand a constant and lifelong access to enjoyment, actually drama-
tizes the ways that the subject must give up on his enjoyment to survive. 
Wordsworth is exploring the same dilemma that we identified above in 
The Sorrows of Edith: he mourns the enjoyment lost to the Other from 
which he must remain barred.
Wordsworth seems to think that the child, for a while, has access to 
the enjoyment from the great beyond, which is why the child is “always 
already dead” (Faflak, 156). I prefer to think of the poem as dramatizing 
the condition that Eric Santner calls “undeadness,” which appears, ac-
cording to Santner, “above all in the life of the child”: as we are “placed 
in the space of relationality” with the Other, we discover in ourselves 
“an internal alienness that has a peculiar sort of vitality and yet belongs 
to no form of life” (36, emphasis in original). This condition, at the heart 
of the Immortality Ode, is what activates the allusion to “My Heart 
Leaps Up.” That poem, after all, makes a demand for “de- animation,” 
to again borrow Santner’s term, rather than a demand for the restitu-
tion of jouissance (Santner, 44). The wished-for sacrifice is carried out 
through the materiality of the poem’s language: “Or let me die!,” an 
iambic line half as long as it ought to be, answers the speaker’s demand 
by presenting its own lack and thus cutting itself short: you will die, 
deprived of your enjoyment, but until then you must draw what you 
can from the positive presence of that lack. Yet, once that line, “The 
Child is father of the Man,” returns as the epigraph to the Immortality 
Ode in 1815, it has repressed the forced choice of this vel:  Wordsworth 
quotes only the last three lines of “My Heart Leaps Up,” making the 
line seem like a statement of fact rather than a fraught negotiation 
with the Other. This is highly appropriate, as the poem is very much 
an Ode to lost jouissance, presented as an irrecoverable “glory” and 
“freshness” (l.5). The poem experiments with line lengths, overemphatic 
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rhyme, and a flat, unconvincing tone, all of which highlight the way 
that language itself is what interferes with attempts at enjoyment: “The 
Rainbow comes and goes, / And lovely is the Rose,” offers the speaker 
halfheartedly (ll.10–11), in a couplet that mocks the main aspiration 
of “My Heart Leaps Up.” In the midst of his undeadness, the speaker 
learns to take a share of enjoyment through the repeated lament for 
lost enjoyment: stanza two awkwardly says “glorious” and “glory” in 
the space of three lines, as if an automated drive were looping around 
material repressed since childhood (ll.16, 18). The cost of this new, di-
minished “bliss,” though, is alienation and separation, which accounts 
for Wordsworth’s emphatic rhetoric of individuation through repetition: 
thoughts come “To me alone,” as the speaker imagines “a Tree, of many, 
one, / [in] A single field”; even “The Pansy,” Mariner-like, “Doth the 
same tale repeat” (ll.22, 54–55). The poem, through section 7, laments 
the abdication of jouissance through repression, which it blames on the 
Oedipus complex: Earth, having “a Mother’s mind,” is here thought to 
conspire with womankind in general (as represented by the synecdo-
che of the “homely Nurse”) to force “Man” to “Forget the glories he 
hath known” (ll.81–83). Wordsworth, through this misogynist fantasy, 
is interested in the ways that enjoyment is strictly delimited, especially 
confined to the processes of signification: “unto this he frames his song: / 
Then he will fit his tongue” (ll.96–97). The child, caught between “his 
mother’s kisses” and “his father’s eyes!” is stalked by the “imperial pal-
ace whence he came” (l.84)—namely, jouissance. The poem focuses 
on the boy’s burgeoning desire to reclaim a portion of that repressed 
 jouissance through the signifier, “As if his whole vocation / Were endless 
imitation” (ll.106–107). Facing “the inevitable yoke” of language and 
ideology, the Wordsworthian subject refers enjoyment to the big Other, 
here called “nature.” A repository of discarded jouissance, “nature yet 
remembers / What was so fugitive,” and so, though we have no imme-
diate access to our enjoyment, “in our embers / Is something that doth 
live”  (ll.124–134). This “something” is the unconscious—a positivized 
absence that has effects everywhere but is unknowable directly. Once 
equipped with its self-allusive epigraph, the poem highlights the problem 
of making do with “primal sympathy,” that is, learning to be separated 
from oneself, so as to better generate partial enjoyment through the re-
peated rehearsal of lack, as accessed through the signifier.
Admittedly, I am reading Wordsworth’s invocations of nature a bit 
differently than does Batten or Faflak. For Batten, Lacan offers an im-
plicit corrective to Wordsworth, in effect reminding us that “Nature 
herself must be liberated … from the demand the she liberate mankind” 
(579). I would agree that Wordsworth is theorizing fantasy and that 
Lacan is suspicious of any appeal to nature. Yet, to return to Lacan’s 
advisory from Seminar XXV, the poem, in its proto-Lacanian wisdom, 
emphatically posits that “reality is constituted only by phantasy, and 
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phantasy is moreover what gives material for poetry.” The key, in my 
brief reading of Wordsworth, is to see that nature is not the name for 
a lost “gleam” of enjoyment; rather, nature is a repository of signifiers, 
which “remembers” that gleam and is presumed to have access to it. It 
is not, then, that Wordsworth’s fantasy is “inevitably unrealizable,” as 
Batten supposes, or that the imagined child is always already dead, as 
Faflak would have it; quite to the contrary, fantasy creates the subject’s 
reality, the very conditions for his or her existence, once jouissance 
stops not being written (Batten, 579; Faflak, 156). What had seemed 
like a contrast between the two Wordsworth poems would now ap-
pear to be merely a time lapse: “My Heart Leaps Up” dramatizes an 
earlier moment in subject formation, in which the subject gives up on 
his enjoyment; “Ode” depicts the outcome of that process, namely de-
sire, as the speaker becomes subjected to the autonomous repetitions of 
the drive. Lacan, ambiguously engaging both poems at once through 
their shared line, is reminding us that psychoanalysis developed out of a 
Wordsworthian vision of subjectivity. As we have seen, the psychoana-
lytic “content” of these poems arises from features of its form: allusion, 
repetition, rhyme, tone, meter, line length, and metaphor. This figural 
work connects Wordsworth to psychoanalysis and Lacan to Word-
sworth, binding Lacan’s identification with Wordsworth (at the level 
of the Imaginary) to the materiality of Wordsworth’s poetic language 
(at the level of the Symbolic) and the Real of the speaker’s irretrievable 
jouissance.
In such a way, “Romanticism,” Lacan explains, “turns out to be a 
confused introduction to the dialectic of signifiers as such, of which psy-
choanalysis is, in short, the articulated form” (Seminar V, 123). That 
is, Romanticism enacts the dialectic of signifiers, while psychoanalysis 
explains it. Lacan thought that British Romanticism had a special role 
in the history of psychoanalytic thought. The period’s writing, he found, 
curtails the free play of the id in language that had characterized ear-
lier authors like Molière. Love was a central concept for Molière’s, says 
Lacan, “and it will [would] remain so”—that is, it would remain a cru-
cial theme in European literature—“until the appearance of Roman-
ticism” (Seminar V, 123). Thus, Romanticism functioned as a cut in 
literary discourse, offering the literary tradition only a loss: it reduced 
the grand comedy of love to a matter of signification, permanently delim-
iting the function of the literary libido. This would seem, at first glance, 
to have been a blow to literature—indeed, exactly the type of blow that 
Wordsworth laments in the Immortality Ode. Yet, that blow, Lacan 
explains, laid the foundations of psychoanalysis, which is why British 
Romanticism can serve as a “confused introduction” to the psychoana-
lytic field. Today, meaning in our post-Lacanian world, we are liable to 
discover “the well-rehearsed, basic Lacanian narrative of the foundation 
of the individual subject upon ‘lack’ … ending in our initiation into the 
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Symbolic order” when we read Romantic poetry, as Hewitt points out in 
his analysis of Percy Bysshe Shelley (787). But, it is not that the Romantic 
poets had miraculous premonitions of a future psychoanalysis; rather, it 
is that Lacan, like Freud, had inherited a Romantic model of the psyche 
and of language. Romanticism, in Lacan’s view, marks a transitional 
moment in the history of subjectivity: it tells the stories of subjects learn-
ing to desire through the signifier. Romanticism marks
the pivotal moment at which the presentation of relations between 
the id and language, in the form of a taking possession of language 
by the id, is about to give way to the introduction of the dialectic of 
man’s relations with language in a blind, closed form.
(Lacan, Seminar V, 123)
This tragic dialectic, supposedly invented by Romantic poets and writ-
ers, would in the following century become the core of what makes 
 Lacan, Lacan.
This dialectic of the signifier led Lacan, later in his career, to engage 
with analytic philosophers who were theorizing, from their logician’s 
standpoint, the grammatical function of proper names (see Frege, 
 Russell). In doing so, he again placed Romantic-era writing at the crux 
of the debate, as he began to theorize the sinthome. Here, we can see 
how Lacan’s Romanticism at the level of the Real comes back to dis-
lodge a more conventional, and purely Symbolic, interest in the legacy 
of  Romanticism within philosophical circles. I want to show how, on 
the one hand, Lacan’s engagement of Romanticism is structured across 
three levels, like a Borromean knot, and tied together at the level of 
figuration, and on the other hand, how Lacan’s theorization of the 
 Borromean knot, and the sinthome that ties it, arises out of his en-
gagement with  British Romanticism. Because Lacan’s Seminar on “The 
Sinthome” takes James Joyce as its subject, there is a tendency to associ-
ate the sinthome with highly challenging modernist writing (Colebrook, 
65; Sass). Yet, Lacan was thinking about the sinthome in relation to 
Walter Scott—a  Romantic-era novelist not known for reveling in the 
playfulness of  lalangue—in previous years.
Taking up an example debated by Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell, 
Lacan, in Seminar XVIII, stresses that the name “Sir Walter Scott” is 
not grammatically equivalent to the phrase “the author of Waverley” 
(Lacan, Seminar XVIII, sec.13.1.1971). For Frege and Russell, the ques-
tion has nothing to do with Walter Scott or Waverley (1814): they are 
simply testing the grammatical limits of using the name of a text to 
stand in for the name of an author. Frege argues that proper names have 
a sense (Sinn) separate from their reference (Bedeutung); Russell is more 
interested in the work of denotation. Yet, the example of Scott is far 
from typical, given how Scott actually did sign his works “The Author 
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of Waverley,” as part of an elaborate attempt to efface himself from his 
texts. As Andrew Parker has perceptively argued, Scott himself, being 
especially attuned to the unconscious, was unsure if he even was the 
“author of Waverley.” As Parker explains:
Scott hesitated to identify his fictions simply as his own; he may 
have written the novels that were formerly anonymous—their man-
uscripts (most of them, anyway) betray the sign of his own ‘hand’—
but whether he can claim to be their author is another question 
entirely… . To acknowledge one’s works as one’s own, then, is to 
admit the possibility that they always may not be. This potential 
remains haunting for Scott.
(82–83)
Lacan, responding to Frege and Russell, seems to understand this di-
mension of Scott’s work: he slyly says that Scott was “effectively the au-
thor of the Waverley novels” (Seminar XVIII, sec.13.11.1971). Though 
it seems like a subtle shift, such an intervention completely derails the 
debate between Frege and Russell: Lacan has gone far beyond a semantic 
question and has begun to question whether Scott really was the au-
thor of these novels. He even seems to doubt whether the novel is called 
 Waverley in any case—perhaps implicitly acknowledging that Frege had 
been discussing Scott’s entire series of “Waverley novels,” or that the 
first novel had a subtitle, “or, ’Tis Sixty Years Since”—and so settles 
for simply calling the text “this work that is called Waverley” (Semi-
nar XVIII, sec.13.1.1971). This uncertainty, too, completely destroys 
the example. Lacan seems bent on demonstrating that “there is only one 
Bedeutung [meaning, signification], die Bedeutung des Phallus”  (Seminar 
XVIII, 13.1.1971). By 1975, as he concludes Seminar XXII, Lacan sug-
gests that “Sir Walter Scott” cannot be “the author of  Waverley” in 
any straightforward way, because the Real interferes at the moment of 
seeming confluence between these terms:
The descriptions of Russell, those that question themselves about 
the author, those that ask why it is legitimate and logically fragile 
to question the fact of whether or not Walter Scott is the author of 
Waverley, it seems that this reference explicitly concerns what is in-
dividualised by the thought-out support of bodies. It is certainly in 
fact nothing of the kind. The notion of referent aims at the Real. It 
is as Real, that what the logicians imagine as Real, gives its support 
to the referent.
(Lacan, Seminar XXII, sec.13.05.75)
This is what leads Lacan to promise to develop a theory of the sinth-
ome for the next year. Although that seminar ended up focusing on 
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James Joyce, it was Walter Scott, who was “effectively” the author of 
“this work which is called Waverley,” who pointed him the think about
nomination from the Imaginary as inhibition, nomination from the 
Real as … anxiety, or nomination from the … flower of the Sym-
bolic itself, … as it happens in fact in the form of the symptom.
(Seminar XXII, sec.13.05.75)
Lacan, following what he calls “the impetus of metaphor,” has identified 
the need for a fourth term that will tie this Borromean knot  (Seminar 
XXII, sec.17.12.74). Here again, Lacan uses his surprisingly specific 
knowledge of British Romantic writing to intervene in a philosophi-
cal debate, this time complicating the meaning of the author-function 
through an oblique acknowledgment of Scott’s own authorial anxieties. 
Lacan, engaging a debate about names that was confined to the Sym-
bolic register, identifies an anxiety in Scott arising at the level of the 
Imaginary, to consider the vengeance of the Real as it “gives its support 
to the referent.”
What the Romantics understood about language, says Lacan, was the 
same thing that Freud grasped in Jokes and Their Relation to the Un-
conscious: that “the pleasure in a joke is only complete in the Other and 
through the Other” (Lacan, Seminar V, 93). Because the jouissance is 
always transferred to the Other’s account, there arises a need for a fig-
ural level, through the blankness of the master signifier, to make fantasy 
sustainable: “this indeed is what constitutes the privilege of the phallus, 
it is that you can summon it as much as you like, it will always say noth-
ing” (Lacan, Seminar XVIII, sec.13.1.1971). No writing can achieve this 
fusion of levels fully—but Lacan implies that writing comes closest to 
this ideal during “the fertile Romantic period” (Lacan, Seminar V, 92). 
It is specifically English Romanticism that marked these developments, 
as Lacan sees it:
The question of Witz is there at the heart of all Romantic specula-
tion, which will hold our interest as much from a historical point 
of view as from that of the situation of analysis. What is altogether 
striking is that there is nothing in France that corresponds to this 
interest.
(Seminar V, 14)
He does not offer an opinion as to why this would have been an En-
glish phenomenon, specifically, or what makes Romanticism especially 
 “fertile.” Yet, elaborating, he explains:
After the eighteenth century with Addison, Pope, and so on, this dis-
cussion continues into the early nineteenth century with the English 
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Romantic school, where the question of wit could not fail to be put 
on the agenda. Hazlitt’s writings are very significant in this regard. 
It was Coleridge, whom we will have occasion to discuss, who went 
the furthest in this direction.
(Lacan, Seminar V, 13)
Lacan never did seem to find “occasion” to discuss Coleridge at greater 
length. But, he did remain committed to the idea that understanding 
British Romanticism makes possible a different and better—and more 
Freudian—understanding of psychoanalysis. A Freudian praxis that un-
derstands the legacy of British Romanticism, Lacan suggests, will be less 
normative and prescriptive than it is prone to be:
These considerations incite us to reexamine the true, solid backbone 
of Freud’s thought. No doubt psychoanalysis has ended up ordering 
all the material of its experience in terms of an ideal development. 
But at its beginning [i.e., in Romanticism], it finds its terms in a 
wholly different system of references, to which development and 
genesis only give intermittent support.
(Lacan, Seminar VII, 25)
Here again, Lacan holds British Romanticism, then, to be “psycho-
analysis … at its beginning,” a period valuable to psychoanalysis for its 
lack of interest in molding people according to normative developmental 
patterns. Romanticists such as Faflak have maintained that Romantic-era 
psychoanalysis could fashion alternatives to normative Freudian orthodox-
ies, working “beyond the Freudian ken of an analytic cure” (Faflak, 230). 
 Lacan, however, sees British Romanticism as the key to a more thorough-
going fidelity to Freud and as the “true, solid backbone” of psychoanalysis. 
Romanticism, through its experiments in figuration, taught Lacan how to 
be more rigorously Freudian, and in this sense, made Lacan “Lacan.”
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